We come prepared to track events and objects, building our knowledge base while foraging for coherence. Classical pragmatism recognizes that the acquisition of knowledge is in part a contact sport (e.g. Peirce, Dewey). One of the aims of neuroscience is to capture human experience. One route to perhaps achieve this may be through the study of the visual system and its expansion in our evolutionary history. Embodied cephalic systems, as Dewey knew well, are tied to self-corrective inquiry. A philosophy of neuroscience needs to capture how such events are tracked, tested through experience, and subsequently modified in the brain to comprise a knowledge base.
Introduction
Neuroscience is unique; it is a lot about ourselves-not in the sense in which we are reduced neuronal systems, but in the sense that we exhaust everything we want to know about ourselves if we were to understand the neurons and their connections. Of course, that would be incredibly exciting. And there are large groups of scientists trying to do just that both here and abroad (e.g. Hawrylycz et al. 2012) .
The study of the brain is tied to self-reflective sensibilities (e.g., "who am I?"). Humans have been cogitating the brain for a long time, perhaps beginning in North Africa. In the broader ambiance of the ancient Near East (e.g., the Sumerians), some of the first examples of writing and elaborate civilization seem to have emerged. The Egyptians also focused some study on the brain (Hippocrates; Pliny; see Gross 1990; Finger 1994) . We know this because of the use of the papyrus plant (which grows near the Nile region), which the Egyptians used to make writing materials. In some of this writing, depicted below, the word "brain" is noted 6 times on the page.
The manuscript contains depictions of different types of cranial wounds, cerebrospinal fluid, and the meninges, and discusses the effects of brain lesions on function.
In this essay, I explore an ontology and ontogeny of the exploration of visual objects from a pragmatist perspective within neuroscience. Humans are a species for which vision has taken precedence in diverse ways and dominates our intellectual sensibility. It is not that other sensory systems do not reflect our evolution; audition, olfaction, and gustation are, for instance, very important for our species.
Ontogeny, ontology and inquiry
Metaphors of growth dominate our conceptual landscape; biological perspectives across most cultures are linked to birth, growth, and decay. At first, there were just objects of importance in literally foraging for food, water, and safety. The earliest cave paintings reflect this fact. But knowledge and tools are rooted in objects, and the imagination is a key feature of the human mind, which, with suitable skill and ease, lifts us towards explanation and the development of expanding tools for discovery.
Indeed, the language of Aristotle is all about growth and trajectories. The identification of objects is a core epistemic state in foraging for coherence. If one eschews the search for essences so beloved of Aristotle but retains the notion of objects, foraging for coherence, prediction and reliability of events, amidst physical and computational constraints, then one has retained a world that is quite rich for inquiry.
A cultural evolution that goes from observation and development of instruments, to experimentation and testing, lies at the heart of investigation in the neurosciences. Observation and quantification within theory, aim at understanding the normal evolution and devolution of function.
Sampling and interpretation are running themes in foraging for coherence; testing and keeping track of events are inherent activities, while interpretation and inquiry are separable. But they are also quite permeable and continuous; the semantic network is active in hypothesis formation and interpretation. Embodied cephalic capability is an adaption, rich in engagement and discovery with an evolving arsenal of symbolic and metaphoric expansion, all of which are grounded by action and hypothesis testing (Dewey 1916; 1925) .
We come prepared to learn to track events, code them with expectations, and build up a knowledge base, which is contextual and endlessly historical. These events are rich Figure 1 . Depiction of text and paper, plant for the paper, and Egyptian symbol for the brain in instruments and core theories and search engines, and understanding of objects for our species is dominated by vision, rooted in a sensory system that evolved with us.
Young children come with a propensity to make sense of the world in which they, like adults, forage for coherence. Children primarily think in terms of objects (Carey 1987) .The child always looks for coherence about objects and their permanence, and predicts time and space. Reliability and predictability are core features in foraging for epistemological coherence, sampling parts of the environment.
Children come prepared early in ontogeny to forage for coherence. Sampling begins early as well. Moreover, a core feature is the taxonomization of objects into kinds. The young child probes the storehouse of knowledge, but searchlights that guide action are omnipresent. Of course, that is quite different from accurate knowledge of any sort. Coherence is the normative goal for cognitive adaptation. Developmental psychologists over the last 30 years (Carey 1987) suggest this process begins with the first year. In children, there is certainly no separation of the sensory-motor and the cognitive. Children sample the environment for useful information and predictive information at the heart of the knowing process.
The emphasis is not on concepts in the abstract, but rather on the concrete sense of experiments, prediction, and probabilities, building on a natural propensity to explore objects and predict events about nature built into a toolbox of orientation towards objects and inquiry.
Expansion of visual objects
It is no so much that children change their orientation to objects, although it is certainly the case that their knowledge base changes and expands. It is rather that sensory motor exploration is already embedded in theory, in notions of objects, in considerations of what is alive or not, concepts of what animals might be or not.
Children also learn easily about what the brain might be, and have an orientation to talk about it, describe it, and project part of bodily tissue in conversation early on. Whether a particular concept is innate I never find particularly instructive, but how easily we are oriented towards understanding and then projecting ideas about bodily tissue, brain, spleen, heart etc.
Understanding objects is, like most forms of knowledge, acquisition is a contact sport: grasping engaging, manipulating, etc. Within this early period of development is development of memory (Kagan 1984) . Children categorize into kinds of objects (e.g. manmade, natural object, animal, plant; see Keil 1979) , and use their memories of those objects to define newly encountered objects. Children can be construed as little scientists (Gopnik and Metlzoff 1997) , as some developmental cognitive scientists have stated. Like scientists, children engage in common problem solving search mechanisms, sampling, tracing, or tagging events that matter. Indeed, keeping track of what we are foraging to understand is a key feature in our evolutionary development and our ontogenetic development.
The lexicon expands, but the orientation is still quite basic (Keil 1987) . Knowledge of the brain is just a further expression of a basic capability and adaptation in the organization of knowledge, tagging, and tracking events; Young children come prepared to link kinds of objects together into category specific features (insects). Indeed inferences about underlying properties of the brain are made by children as young as five in explaining human behavior, the intentions to the brain, and other properties of the body (Kagan 1984) .
Young children tend to attribute internal generator properties when behavior is self-generated (Keil 1979) , and may even overvalue "natural traits" over more acquired capabilities. Young children attribute social and motor behavior with features of the brain, a core feature in identity of individuals that they know, features retained in the body.
Most of these events are linked to visual objects. Other sensory features are linked to basic nutritional issues (salt taste and sweet and metabolic needs), hearing and the development of language and communicative capabilities, olfaction and basic contact. Object identification is a key feature in getting anchored to real world objects.
We come prepared with a toolbox of conceptual tools to catalogue and track visual objects across the visual cortex, to discern meaning for what something is and where it is in diverse neural systems that represent the sensory features of the objects (Martin 1998; Ungerleider and Mishkin 1982) , to pick out faces in a crowd with great speed, to link eye contact, and social cooperative or deceptive behaviors with visual acuity with expanding cortical expression (Dunbar and Shultz 2007) and joint neuronal activity as we watch others look at objects (Jeannerod 1997; 1999) .
The expansion of vision came along with standing upright, the use of tools, and diverse capabilities in which vision became a dominate sense. While vision is but one sense amongst others, it is the sense most linked to object knowledge.
Core visual mechanisms set the conditions for the expanded sense in which our species copes with and manages objects of relevance and of interest. Indeed, our grappling with objects is depicted on the walls of prehistory: caves that have withstood the ravages of the elements to bring us these ancient drawings from as much as 30,000 years ago (Foley 2006) . These images are anchored to acquisition (starting with prey items), or for warning (see Figure 2 ). Not surprisingly, the vast array of visual imagery that we used at first just to capture objects of sight, and then the expansion of our cultural legacy, is still ongoing as visual tools and aids expand our horizons. Tools for capturing objects are part of an art tied to vision and to capturing nature. Indeed visual space and visual imagery is a fundamental form by which we engage the world.
Numerous examples of categorical changes in perspectives depicted in art pervade our cultural landscape such as game changers or shifts in perspective. Pertinent examples include Giotto's new humanist style and the capturing of perspective in Italy in the 13 th century. The tools of art are tied to the visual constructs of our environment; whether the windows are open or closed in a painting by van Gogh (Heelan 1983) , for instance; the ecological/ social environment figures into the geometry of space and of visual objects.
Our language is endlessly rich in vision; and it should be; we are endlessly visual. Blind individuals who have never seen color or objects still intelligently and knowingly use language which is rich in visual imagery. Visual imagination and visual memory reflect many of the same regions of the brain; to visual regions of the brain, and visual complexity is a feature of neural engagement (e.g., area 17 Kosslyn 1994) . Visual construction is less of a mystery; visual images are a product of the visual system in the brain; imaging and seeing drawings on many of the same neural and computational resources. The insight, which might sound not surprising, is that imagining a visual object and looking at the object recruits many of the same visual regions of the brain (Kosslyn 1994) . While neural activation can be manipulated by experimental suggestions (e.g., imagining a face), it is not just a feature of the visual system. This also holds for other sensory systems; imagining music, for instance, activates regions of the brain critical for hearing (Zattore and Halpern 2005) .
The language systems are tied to the visual system, and the loss of sight also results in compensatory responses in other sensory perception (e.g., hearing). All human sensory systems play an important role in our functioning as a species, but the evolution of our visual system, as it works with other systems, continues to define our place in the world.,
The study of vision is perhaps the oldest subspecialty within neuroscience, dating back to the Egyptians through Western and Eastern antiquity and up through the Medieval period. Depictions of vision and visions, seeing the light of reason, of how things permeate the landscape of the ancient and modern worlds, is an ancient calling. Plato, for instance, most notably identified the ascent from the cave and darkness to the perception of forms and sight, a philosophical journey expressed as a visual one. This is a statement of desire and, indeed, the phrase "let there be light" implies the ability to see clearly.
The metaphors that predominate our language are visual; seeing the light, seeing through things, sight as clarity, are just a handful. And indeed diverse forms for the anatomy of sight and light are found quite beautifully throughout the printed world over the last 100 years.
Vision is pregnant with diverse cognitive capabilities and reveals the greatest expansion across the neural axis. This is particularly true for the visual cortex (Dunbar and Shultz 2007;  see Figure 3 ).
We know that our social capabilities are highly correlated with expansion of cortical tissue (Dunbar and Shultz 2007) , a common theme in primate evolution. These capabilities are particularly linked with the visual cortex (Barton 2004) .
Indeed, we are a species oriented towards looking at objects, at others, at what others are looking at, and looking together. Looking at each other is reflected in the volume expansion of the primary visual cortex and in comparison to several closely related species (Dunbar and Shultz 2007) . What changed for primates was the expansion of the visual systems, elegantly depicted in the next figure. The expansion of vision is most palpable in terms of the visual cortex (Van Essen et al. 1992; Van Essen 2005) . A lateral view of the macaque visual system is depicted below; what is outstanding is the massive visual brain both cortically and subcortically (Van Essen 2005; see Figure 5 ).
All aspects of our coordinated adaptive systems are linked to visual function. For instance, visual systems guide motor control. The visual expansion is perhaps reflective across the distributed network of the visual system, including both neocortical and other regions of the visual system (Barton 2004) .The degree of cortical visual expansion is depicted in the comparison of mouse and human below (Koch and Clay 2012; see Figure 6 ).
While there are differences in mice in visual cortex there is a remarkable conservation of gene expression (Hawrylycz et al. 2012 ). Mammalian neocortex is best characterized in terms of laminar cytoarchitecture. Cell specific types and receptors are apparent throughout cortical and subcortical regions.
Importantly, the primate visual cortex (rhesus, human) is the most differentiated gene morphology when compared to all other cortical tissue. This is of course consistent with the fact that the visual cortex is what has expanded most in humans. These data reveal a common theme; mainly conservation of gene expression across species and genes tied to excitation and inhibition of neuronal function. Tracking objects and object meaning
The dominance of tracking objects is particularly prominent in homo sapiens. The visual agnosias are a group of pathological conditions in which an individual cannot recognize or apply meaning to a set of objects. Our vast ability is to sample and utilize visual information through attention, memory, recognition, and associations; see Farrah 1990).
What we do know is that visual input is always rich in information; meaning pervades the input that occurs across diverse forms of computational capabilities. The neural systems are oriented to visual objects and their meaning within categories that reflect sensory motor events and action. If an object is a tool, for instance, it is represented in the brain in terms of its function, in addition to visual categories like color or shape (Martin 1998; .
There are in fact diverse visual systems. A dorsal projection from the visual cortex is oriented to where an object is located, and a ventral stream is oriented to object meaning or identification of objects (Ungerleider and Mishkin 1982; see Figure 7 ). Other areas determine whether to approach an object.
The search for the neural basis for determining object meaning traces back to the Klüver-Bucy syndrome and visual meaning. Large lesions of the temporal lobe, including that of the amygdala, result in decrement in object meaning, misperception of objects, and inappropriate behaviors to object temporality. Klüver-Bucy Syndrome equates to loss of object meaning, Figure 7 and to inappropriate understanding of objects. This disorder demonstrates the importance of the temporal region in creating meaning through vision.
However, there is no absolute separation of where something is and what it is in the brain; this is probably a feature of neural design. There will be degrees of separation of detection and broader semantic meaning; but detection is embedded in foraging and making sense of one's surroundings (Milner and Goodale 1995) . The visual system focuses on features of the environment (Gibson 1966; Rozin 1976 ) within diverse computation capabilities, but also to keeping track of objects over space and time. The visual system is, particularly for humans, oriented to fixing reference to objects in order to apply meaning and significance (Carey 2012) .
Faces, for instance are rich objects and a wide array of neural regions are tied to facial expressions. Faces offer such a wide array of sources of information to con-specifics that Darwin (1872; see Ekman 1972 ) spent a good portion of his book on the biology of emotion as expressed in facial expression (Figure 8) .
A key feature of primate behavior is gaze tracking; watching what a con-specific is looking at. We do it well, we do it all the time, and it shows up early in ontogeny. Much less clear is the extent to which other species do so. Joint visual attention is a primary feature of humans, a basic reflex loaded with meaning and essential to foraging for coherence in a social world (Tomasello 1999) . Attention is knotted to goals so that before attention becomes manifest, visual focus narrows in scope.. This narrowing of focus sets the state for attention (James 1890) . Visual stimuli elicit a wide array of visual and non-visual regions; the amygdala in particular is responsive to visual stimuli. Of course the amygdala, embedded in the temporal region, can be understood as part of the ventral pathway (Ungerleider and Mishkin 1982) , coding the meaning of visual events within visual categories of biological significance that underlie foraging for coherence (Gross 1990) .
Imagining the size of objects takes only the briefest amount of time. Geometries of space perception are built into the contours of visual construction and adaptation, . Visual construction of objects is more labile, more tied context and function, than traditional Euclidian geometry (Heelan 1983) .
Vision is also tied to the expression "visionary"; to see ahead, to see what is worthy, to see at all, to see what matters. Foraging for coherence implies tracking events and objects that matter, and discerning relationships within a logic discovery, something Peirce (1878) called "abduction" or sometimes "retroduction"-namely the logic of hypothesis formation (see also Hanson 1959) .
We start from discerning relationships of meaning packed with coherence; a fundamental set of predilections that converged in our evolution. Scavenging for survival, forming links to persevere, underlies our evolution ripe with representation of objects, left in caves and burial sites as mementoes of the human mind and its development and expansion. Expansion is something other than a contrast between the mind as primitive and as not; the capabilities are part of what has expanded in a brain already selected to talk, to learn, to represent, and to build.
As we are omnivores, foraging for diverse food resources, we have expanded our tools, our foodstuffs, all of our resources, as we make the novel more familiar (Rozin 1976 ). While omnivory is something basic about us, and foraging for food resources is a basic part of our evolutionary past, so too is detecting information. We are really what George Miller called an "informationgore"; there are diverse constraints on the number of items or objects that can be remembered while foraging for coherence. Indeed theories survive as they organize and predict and are tied to our reliable perceptual systems (Peirce 1899) .
The information age did not begin in the 1950's; the concept of information processing took shape in a process that we understand our brain to be mostly tied to-processing information while sampling and foraging for coherence. The action is tied to possible objects of relevance, what Gibson (1966) called "affordances". We forage for meaning in a world prepackaged with adaptive meaning, our brains shaped by an evolutionary and cultural history to discern relevance and track events (Carey 1985) . Endless "bootstrapping" (Carey 1985; Rozin 1976 ) of diverse conceptual capabilities is a core adaptation of our species in the expansion of human understanding and meaning that underlie diverse what Whitehead (1933) called "adventures of ideas" as this human activity is expressed in neuroscience.
In other words, we automatically depict and represent information from the external world-simple ways of detecting external information with minimal cephalic information processing (Clark 1997) . A core adaptation of cephalic expansion and adaptation when it comes to learning and memory, it externalizes it, leading to less processing inside the cerebral apparatus.
And this is the key concept for the brain, namely "information processing." Information processing has become a key term over the last century, from Shannon and Weaver, to Weiner and Turring, though the genomics of this conveys a rather diverse set of examples. It means everything, but unconstrained the concept starts to mean very little. So like most concepts, they need to be unpacked in a social context of groups engaging with one another.
The point is that paradigms guide inquiry; frameworks guide inquiry, and seeing, doing, making, seeing, discerning, testing, is against this background. But in neuroscience these frameworks are much more local, and less pervasive in determining what we do. Now information processing, as I indicated above, is basic to paradigmatic thinking about the brain, and has many meanings. But there is no one meaning; and indeed perhaps that is the point; we can't get off the ground in considering neural function without the notion of information processing, it actually multiplies context, making it more nuanced and varied. That is not to say that there are not common themes across information processing; certainly across the senses, and perhaps attention and short-term memory there are some common themes.
We use this fundamental term "information processing" essentially when understanding coordinated action, regulation within a context of foraging for coherence as investigators. Imagining is tied to possible action; an internal shared sense of hypothesis consideration (Schulkin 2012) , rich in expectations and underlying a broad field of exploration and possible consequences. Information gathering is an achievement, and rich in signifying shared sematic content to a community of investigators (Dewey 1910; 1916; 1925; Peirce 1877; 1899) , in this case neuro-scientific investigators.
The neuroscientific link to distributed neural regions is underwhelming. But there are links, and they cannot be ignored. Perhaps one tool for exploring these links is Bayesian capability, to check on hypotheses and modify our frameworks and codified habits via feedback.
Bayes' theorem is one way in which to understand expectations in terms of prior probabilities that are embedded in our predictions about recurrent events and learning from them. These events lie within a wide array of problem solving capabilities, without one set of consistent overlying rules (Rozin 1976) . In other words, no one unifying super problem solving device exists; rather, we have a wide assortment of adaptive tools that underlie problems involving the evolution of adaptive systems.
But one thing that may be inherent in cephalic function as adaptative systems are probabilistic expectations of diverse forms of sensory information and ways in which to track, link and structure events in meaningful categorical relationships that underlie causal inferences.
Bayes' theorem is a fundamental theorem of probability that states that, for any two events A and B, the probability of A given B can be computed from the probability of B given A, as well as the overall probabilities (known as the "prior probabilities") of A and B.
Moreover, we may be prepared to understand natural frequencies more easily than other ways of representing events as we track objects and events with diverse heuristic devices and revise our orientations to events if we need to.
A Bayesian sense of problem-solving, a realistic metaphor, functions to coordinate expectations with new forms of evidence (Gigerenzer 2000) in a context of predictive capabilities. This is perhaps one part of cephalic capabilities-a 'grab bag' of diverse functions (Rozin 1976 ) that underlie human foraging for coherence and sampling behaviors.
Thus an adaptation is a statistical model of inference tied to tracking events, as well as stimuli that are significant and that provide a context for prediction. There are many ways in which perspective and outlook are a continuous function within sampling and foraging for coherence; a great array of investigators have characterized these events in similar ways (e.g. Dewey 1916 ).
We search from the background lens of exploring and sampling; expectations predominate neural adaptive systems, anchored to behaviors that are tied to hypothesis formation, as well as inductive and deductive logical systems. In foraging for coherence, all three classical systems are ongoing behaviors.
The information age did not begin in the 1950s; the concept of information processing took shape in a process that we understand our brain to be mostly tied to: processing information while sampling and foraging for coherence. We forage for meaning in a world prepackaged with adaptive meaning, our brains shaped by an evolutionary and cultural history to discern relevance and track events (Schulkin 2009; Donald 1990) . Endless "bootstrapping" (Carey 2012 ) of diverse conceptual capabilities is a core adaptation of our species in the expansion of human understanding and meaning that underlies human activity.
Expanding sensibilities: conclusion
Inquiry is grounded in action. Dewey (1910; 1916) , an exponent of continuous education and an expanding knowledge base, realized that we search for coherence embedded in Table 1 . Bayesian inference and information representation (natural sampling of frequencies and standard probability format (Gigerenzer 2000 ) .
practice. Neuroscience is something Dewey referred to in diverse contexts, and always with an eye to education.
But the speed of discovery in neuroscience does not meet everyone's expectations. Demythologizing expectations without dissipating hopes is the knowledge that our science is new, a modern neuroscience. The study of vision has been impeded in a neuroscientific perspective stretching back thousands of years. In the last several years, with the expansion of technology and knowledge, the science of vision and neuroscience in general has exploded.
We have traversed an essential age of neural discovery, through medieval darkness, and into a Renaissance of neural understanding. This journey is embedded in an evolving natural philosophy replete with discovery and invention during the Enlightenment.
What binds us together is the core interest in the brain, which takes us from brain imaging studies to genes, regulatory physiology to behavioral expression, and computational systems and systems neuroscience to adaptation, anatomy, developmental studies, and pathology. The field is endlessly rich and diverse. As adults we live with diversity, not unity, in the neurosciences.
Discerning design features of neural/cognitive adaptation is a core task in neuroscience. Tools, art, and science converge in our capacity to understand the diverse systems within neuroscience. Science and philosophy are continuous with one another. Within this are biological themes about adaptation, conceptions of nature, order in the universe, cataloging of events, purpose, and function.
But perfection is not something associated with biology. Just "good enough" fit (i.e., good enough adaptation) normally gets the job done. A natural philosophy of inquiry is ripe with discernment of "good enough" and "reliable enough" adaptive systems that underlie foraging for coherence.
Tools, art, and science converge in our capacity to understand the diverse systems within neuroscience. Science and philosophy are continuous with one another. Within this are Darwinian themes about adaptation, conceptions of nature, order in the universe, cataloging of events, and purpose and function.
Embedded in the process of satisfying our basic wants and needs are a number of problem-solving skills-something I like to call "cephalic capabilities." I use the word cephalic, an older word not much used in the neurosciences, because of its link to the brain in the context of the body.
Cephalic systems traverse the whole of sensory and information-gathering systems with which we sample the world and update our orientations. There is no separation of a mind from a body, but diverse forms of information sampling of the environment, both internal for what is to be sustained in viable ways, and sampling external events for what is occurring General informational search and discrepancy mechanisms, such as the one outlined above, are core features underlying general inquiry, while we "tame chance" (Hacking, 1990) by making such events predictive. As John Dewey (1925) understood it, we search for the stable amidst the precarious; we search for the predictive.
The science of exploration takes place within a diverse array of cephalic systems designed to facilitate social contact and social meaning (Dunbar and Shultz 2007) . Making contact is a vital resource in our evolutionary ascent, and reflects the expansion of diverse forms of cortical and neocortical functions (Dunbar and Shultz 2007) . Stable groups are a core feature of our species and are directly related to the encephalization of neural tissue.
We evolved in a context of multiple forms of cooperation (Toamasello 1999) , but other motives also anchor our expression, deception being one. But we are by nature a cooperative species, and discerning relationships is key to our cephalic capabilities.
Foraging for coherence is dependent upon others. We discern reciprocal relationships with other investigators and are guided by them into diverse worlds in which we practice, perform, and survive. The ambiance of neuroscience, the practice of it, is forever linked to dependence on others, in being guided and guiding others into action in a sea of joint collaborative bonds.
Much of real inquiry, however, involves struggling with the not-known, the barely-known, or the yet-to-be-known (Dewey 1925) . Inquiry in neuroscience occurs between pockets of knowledge and only somewhat reliable methods of exploration. Hypothesis testing, inference, and feedback are at the heart of this process of discovery (Peirce 1868; 1877; 1878) .
Indeed, from our routine problem solving for survival emerged our ability to discern and act on that which is knowable only with degrees of confidence (Hacking 1990; Peirce 1877; 1878; 1989) that judgmental practice is the heart of statistical inference. We come prepared for statistical reasoning by way of our central nervous system.
One dominant theme in foraging for coherence is the detection of error and the use of various methods to correct effort prediction. Expectations and feedback are a dominant and recurrent theme across cephalic systems and capabilities. These computational systems, embedded in well-worn and tested practices, are at the heart of finding meaning across diverse systems, particularly motor/action/appraisals-a key feature of cephalic adaptive systems. Tracking events is a fundamental feature of our cognitive architecture; predicting and statistical inferences underlie much of human reasoning.
Reason and problem solving aim toward a "good fit," constrained by ecological context and evolutionary history (e.g. Gigerenzer 2000 ). Then we have something Peirce might have expressed, if we go further in integrating a biological perspective with hypothesis formation and abduction. We come prepared with diverse heuristics in problem solving.
Abduction in context, constrained by context and ecology, was something Peirce appreciated. Problem solving drove his whole thought process. Our sensory capacity is keen to detect objects that afford sustenance or harm (Gibson 1966) . Fast forms for detecting information can change the structure. Diverse forms of heuristics-i.e., fast ways to solve problems both specific and general-evolved along with our brain.
We come prepared to associate a number of events linked by causal building blocks in cephalic structures by worldly events. Ecological rationality, readily available heuristics well-grounded in successful decision making, places decision making and the use of statistical features within cephalic predilections about numbers and representations of frequencies in real contexts (Gigerenzer 2000; .
We live in the age of speed. Biological adaptation, however, is not about speed, but about fitness; it is not about perfection, but rather about being good enough. Foraging for coherence reveals the frailty of inquiry, the existential part of our lives. Science reflects the larger cultural milieu, which is why science, like all human activities, is historically contingent; scientific facts are not ahistorical (that does not mean that the facts are without merit). Indeed, critical realism is essential in foraging for coherence in tracking events and sampling terrains as a common occurrence, one of which is that we often do not reach an understanding that is satisfying (Simon 1982) .
We are anchored to objects. The fact that we have flexibility in visual construction may be a core feature of humans. While we are not exclusively visual, vision dominates in us. Visual construction is tied to context, to objects that matter, and to tracking those objects in neural systems tied to prediction and anticipation of events. Together, these form the stuff of adaptation.
Neuroscience, like all of human thought, scientific or otherwise (Lakoff and Johnson 1999 ) is full of useful metaphors: "mirror" neurons, neurons that "fire" and are "wired together". Metaphors are fundamental to cognitive expansion and foraging for coherence, although they can also do damage when they are taken too literally. For instance, we currently use many computer-based metaphors when talking about how the brain works, and they are useful as a way of expressing what we think is happening. But the brain is not, in fact, a computer, and pushing the metaphor too hard can lead us into misperception, but within a larger context of cephalic adaptions.
